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Abstract 
We provide a characterization of the consequences of the assumption that a decision 
maker with a given utility function is Choquet rational: She maximizes expected utility, 
but possibly with respect to non-additive beliefs, so that her preferences are represented 
by Choquet expected utility ( C EU). 
The characterization shows that this notion of rationality allows in general to ratio­
nalize more choices than it is possible when beliefs have to be additive. More s urprisingly, 
we find that a considerable restriction on the types of beliefs allowed does not change the 
set of rational actions. We then remark on the relation between the predictions of C E U  
model, of a similar model (the maxmin expected utility model), and those of s ubjective 
expected utility when the risk attitude of the decision maker is not known . We close 
with an application of the result to the definition of a solution concept (in the spirit of 
rationalizability) for strategic- form games. 
JEL classification numbers: C 72, D 81 
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Choquet Rationality* 
Paolo Ghirardato Michel Le Breton 
Introduction 
In this note we characterize the consequences of the assumption that a decision maker 
(D M ) facing a decision problem is Choquet rational. That is, assuming that the D M 's 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is known and fixed, we list all the actions 
that could be taken by her if she behaves according to Choquet expected utility ( C E U ) 
model. 
The C E U  model was developed by Schmeidler [29] to explain a common pattern 
of behavior, the most striking instance of which is the well-known Ellsberg paradox 
[9] :  The amount and quality of the information a D M  has about the relevant events 
affects her preferences. In particular, D Ms prefer to act on events they feel well -informed 
about, an attitude which has been called ambiguity aversion. Schmeidler noticed that 
ambiguity aversion can be modelled by extending the standard subjective expected utility 
(S E U ) model to allow the D M  to have non-additive beliefs (called capacities). He also 
provided an axiomatic foundation and a mathematical representation, using a notion 
of expectation due to Choquet [5] (hence C E U ) . A few years earlier, Dempster [6] and 
Shafer [30] developed the statistics of a special class of capacities, called belief functions, 
as a way to capture imprecise probabilities. 
An important, but hereto fore unanswered, question is what is the empirical content 
of the assumption that a D M  is described by the CEU  model. Clearly, it is important 
to know what C E U  does not predict, in order to conclude that it is a useful scientific 
tool. Here we answer the question for the case in which the utility function of the 
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are indebted to Paolo Battigalli, Kim Border, Larry Epstein, John Ledyard, Massimo Marinacci, Igal 
Milchtaich, Klaus Nehring and audiences at Berkeley, Caltech, Paris VI and the LOFT 2 conference 
(Turin, December 1996) , the Conference on "Rationality in Game Theory and Utility Theory" (Caen, 
June 1997) and ESEM 97 (Toulouse, August 1997) for helpful comments and discussion. The second 
author is grateful to the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech for its hospitality 
during the period in which this paper was written. Ghirardato's e-mail is: pa ol o© hss. cal tech. edu. Le 
Breton's address is CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays, 34, 1348 Louvain­
La-Neuve, Belgium. E-mail: lebreton©core . ucl. ac. be. 
DM is known. Besides its theoretical relevance, this "revealed preference" question is 
interesting for the applications of CEU to studying games in strategic form. In fact, 
once Choquet rationality is characterized, it is then possible to define and characterize 
Choquet rationalizability. 
We completely describe the consequences of the assumption that a D M  is a C E U  
maximizer, first for the special case in which her beliefs are represented by belief func­
tions, and then for the general case in which they can be capacities. Surprisingly, our 
characterization of Choquet rationality has a strong resemblance to the one obtained for 
the S E U  case. Precisely : The D M  constructs an "extended" decision problem, and then 
behaves like a S E U  maximizer facing that problem. This allows us to rationalize more 
actions than S E U  rationality would. 1 A striking fact is that no additional predictions are 
obtained by letting the D M's beliefs be represented by capacities which are not belief 
functions. That is, an action which is rationalized by a capacity can be always rational­
ized by a belief function. To prove this result we use an altogether new representation 
of Choquet integrals as additive integrals on an expanded state space, that we believe to 
be of some separate mathematical interest. 
Other papers have looked at revealed preference questions of the sort addressed in 
this paper, and their application to defining solution concepts for strategic form games. 
The classical papers for S E U  preferences are of course Bernheim [1] and Pearce [26]. 
There is also a sizable literature focusing of the revealed preference question for S E U  
preferences (see, e.g., Border [2]). Borgers [3] studies the case in which players are S E U  
maximizers, but only their ordinal preferences are commonly known (their risk attitude 
is not ). Epstein [11] relaxes the notion of rationality to include a large class of models 
of preferences, of which S E U  is a special case. Using the results of Epstein and Wang 
[12], he characterizes the consequences of the assumption that a decision model describes 
all players, and that this is common knowledge among them : The strategies played by 
the players must be in the set surviving iterated deletion of "dominated" strategies. The 
notion of dominance, of course, depends on the model. As illustration, he applies his 
result to some non-expected utility models, for instance the "maxmin expected utility" 
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [17] and the "probabilistically sophisticated" model of 
Machina and Schmeidler [24]. But he does not provide a similar result for the C E U  model, 
since he does not have a characterization of Choquet rationality. Indeed he observes that 
the latter is an open question for future research. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After introducing the necessary notation 
and definitions (Section 1), we characterize the actions which are best replies to belief 
functions, called Shafer rational (Section 2). We then (Section 3) allow beliefs to be 
represented by any capacity, thus characterizing Choquet rationality. Section 4 contains 
some brief remarks on our characterization. Section 5 shows how our result changes 
if the DM has a preference for randomization. Section 6 analyzes the relation with 
Borgers 's "ordinal rationality" notion, and Section 7 wraps up by presenting Choquet 
1 As we discuss in Section 5, this result depends on whether the DM has a preference for randomiza­
tion. 
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rationalizability. The Appendices contain the proofs and technical details. In particular, 
Appendix A contains the derivation of the additive representation of Choquet integrals. 
1 Notation and Preliminaries 
We assume that the D M's preferences can be represented by Choquet expected utility 
maximization on a fully subjective set-up (for axiomatizations, see Gilboa [16] or Wakker 
[34]). We consider a finite space of states of the world D, a set of consequences X. The 
choice set :F is a finite set of functions from n into X, that we call acts. 2 
Given a finite state space D, a set-function v : 2° -+ R is called a (normalized) capacity 
if it satisfies the following conditions: 1) v(0) = 0 and v(D) = 1; 2) if A� B � D, then 
v(A) ::::; v(B) . A belief function (see Shafer [30] ) is a capacity that satisfies the additional 
condition (called total monotonicity): 3) for all n and all collections A 1 , . . .  , An E 2°, 
v(U�=l Ai) 2 L (-1)#1+1v(niEIA), (1) 
J�{l, ... ,n} #0 
where #I is the cardinality of set I .  A capacity which satisfies (1) for pairs of sets 
(n = 2) is called supermodular (convex, 2-monotonic). A probability is a set -function 
that satisfies (1) with equality for e very collection of sets . Thus a probability is a belief 
function, but not vice versa. We let V the set of all the capacities and VB the (sub) set 
of all the belief functions on D. Finally, given any finite set X, we denote by b..(X) the 
set of the probability measures on (X, 2x). 
Give n  a function f : n-+ R, what is the integral of f with respect to a capacity v? 
We use the Choquet integral (see Choquet [5] and Schmeidler [28] ), which for the case 
of finite f2 can be defined as follows: Given f, let n = { w1 , . . .  , WL}, and relabel so that 
f (w1) 2 J(w2) 2 · · · 2 f(wL)· The Choquet integral of f with respect to v is 
L-1 
L f(w) v(dw) = �(f(we) - f(we+1)) v({w1 , . . .  , we})+ f(wL)· ( 2) 
It is easy to see that the Choquet integral is monotonic (that is, if f ( w) 2 g( w) for all 
w E [2 then for any capacity v, ff dv 2 f g dv), and when [2 is finite it is also strictly 
monotonic (if f ( w) > g ( w) for all w E D, then f f dv > f g dv) . The Choquet integral is 
also seen to be comonotonic additive: If f, g : D-+ R are non-negative and comonotonic,3 
then J (f + g) dv = J f dv + Jg dv. 
2 The restriction to finite D is required for the additive decomposition result in Appendix A. Though 
the extension of that result to infinite D appears to be possible, it is beyond the scope of this note. On 
the other hand, the assumption of finiteness of :F can be easily dispensed with, and it is made only in 
order to minimize notation and technicalities. 
3 Two functions f, g : S _, R are said to be comonotonic if there are no w, w' E D such that 
f (w) > f (w') and g (w) < g (w'). 
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An interesting property of supermodular capacities is the following : Call the core of 
a capacity v the set C(v) of all the probabilities that dominate v. Formally, 
C(v) = {P E 6(0) : P(A) 2: v(A) for all A� O}. 
It can be shown ( Kelley [20]) that supermodular capacities (and hence belief functions) 
have a non-empty core, but the converse is not true . Schmeidler [29, Proposition ] has 
shown that for any function f : 0 -----> R, the integral of f with respect to a supermodular 
v is equal to the smallest integral with respect to measures in its core C(v) . That is, 
{ f(w) v(dw) = min { f(w) P(dw). lo PEC(v) lo ( 3) 
The D M  has preferences t on :F which are represented as follows : There exists a 
function u: X-----> R and a capacity v: 2°-----> [O, 1 ]  such that for every f, g E :F, 
f t g � 1 u(f(w)) v(dw) 2: 1 u(g(w)) v(dw), 
where the integrals are taken in the sense of Choquet. Since the utiility function u is 
kept fixed throughout the analysis, we shall abuse notation and write f in place of u of. 
That is, we henceforth treat acts as real -valued functions . 
Following standard terminology for S E U  preferences, an act J E :F is said to be 
strongly dominated if there is a E 6(:F \ {]}) such that, for every w, 
L a(j) f(w) > f(w). 
fE:F\{f} 
We also say that J is purely (strongly) dominated if there is such a a which is degenerate 
on some act f E :F. It is widely known that a strategy which is not strongly dominated 
is the optimal choice for some additive beliefs P E 6(0) (see Proposition 5 in App . B) . 
Hence such a strategy is also called SEU rational. 
2 Prelude: Shafer Rationality 
Suppose that a D M  is facing Problem 1 (where the entries are utility payoffs) . Assume 
that 3/2 > E > 0. It is easy to see that if the D M  chooses an act which maximizes 
expected utility with respect to additive beliefs P on 0, then she will never choose h. 
( This can be verified directly, or by noticing that h is strongly dominated by the convex 
combination of f and g with weight 1/2.) What if, instead, the D M  maximizes the 
Choquet expectation of utility with respect to a belief function? The (unsurprising) 
answer is that then we cannot rule out h. In fact there are belief functions for which h is 
optimal, for instance the "complete ignorance" belief v which assigns weight 0 to either 
4 
f 
g 
h 
3 0 
0 3 
E E 
PROBLEM 1 
W1 or W2 and 1 ton. Since the DM perceives ambiguity (has poor in formation ) about the 
states w1 and w2, she prefers the "safe" act h - which assures her a payoff of E whatever 
happens - to the other "risky" acts . 
We are thus led to the revealed pre ference question : Are there acts that will not be 
chosen by a D M  with C E U  preferences? For the case of belief functions, the answer 
turns out to be straightforward. We first introduce some notation and a definition. We 
let N = 2° \ {0}, and extend every act f to a function f:  N -t R as follows : for A EN, 
f(A) = min f(w). wEA (4) 
The definition extends S E U  rationality by allowing the D M's beliefs to be represented 
by a belief function : 4  
Definition 1 An act f* E F is called Shafer rational if there exists a belief function 
v E VB such that for all f E F, 
1 f*(w) v(dw) � 1 f(w) v(dw). 
Act f* is called Shafer dominated if it is not Sha fer rational . Using game-theoretic 
terminology :  Act f* is Shafer rational if it is a best reply to some belief (function ) . We 
can now answer the question posed above by characterizing Shafer rationality . 
Theorem 1 Act f* is Shafer rational if and only if there does not exist O' E b.(F\ {!*}) 
such that for all A E N, 
L O'(j) f(A) > f*(A). (5) 
fE:F\{f*} 
This result (which is Cor. 2 in App . B) is an immediate consequence of the characteri­
zation of SEU  rationality , and a widely known representation of Choquet integrals with 
respect to belief functions as (additive ) integrals with respect to probabilities on a larger 
state space (Cor . 1 in App . A .2) . 
4 Recall that the DM's utility function is assumed to be known and fixed in the analysis. 
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f 
g 
h 
3 
0 
E 
0 0 
3 0 
E E 
Table 1: The extension of Problem 1 
3 Choquet Rationality 
The characterization of Theorem 1 is surprisingly simple and appealing, as it bears a lot 
of resemblance with that of S E U  rationality : A D M maximizing a Choquet integral with 
respect to a belief function behaves like a S E U  maximizer who faces a problem with an 
"extended" state space 2° \ {0}, where acts are extended in the "pessimistic" manner 
described by Eq. (4).5 For instance, in Problem 1, it is as if a S E U  D M  were looking at 
the problem given by Table 1. Here h is not strongly dominated, so Theorem 1 confirms 
what we argued above : There is a belief function which rationalizes the choice of h. 
On the other hand , it has certainly not escaped the reader's attention that we have 
considered only a very special class of capacities, namely belief functions. It is reasonable 
to conjecture that if we allowed the D M's beliefs to be an arbitrary capacity , we would be 
able to rationalize more acts, thus obtaining a weaker prediction . This is also suggested 
by the fact that belief functions embody (as shown by Ghirardato and Marinacci [1 5]) 
a form of "ambiguity aversion" : One would expect the picture to change once we allow 
capacities which entail "ambiguity loving" behavior. 
The main finding of this note is that this conjecture is surprisingly wrong. To present 
this result, we start by extending of Definition 1, so as to allow the DM 's beliefs to be 
represented by an arbitrary capacity . 
Definition 2 An act f* E F is called Choquet rational if there exists a capacity v E V 
such that for all f E F) 
1 f*(w) v(c!J») 2: 1 f(w) v(c!J»). 
Clearly, if an act is Shafer rational, it is also Choquet rational. What is less obvious is 
that the converse is also true. 
Theorem 2 Act f* E F is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. 
5 The technique of looking at this extended decision problem for describing best replies to belief 
functions is not new. Hendon et al. used it in [19) , where they discuss a notion of equilibrium for games 
in which players' beliefs can be belief functions. 
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In other words : An act is a best reply to a capacity if and only if it is a best reply 
to a belief function. The proof of this result uses a different additive representation 
of the Choquet integral which is, to the best of our knowledge, new. It is presented 
in Appendix A ( Prop. 3). The proof of Theorem 2 is found in Appendix C, but the 
intuition is very simple : For any capacity v rationalizing act f*, one can use its additive 
representation to explicitly construct a belief function v '  which also rationalizes f*. 
Theorem 2 shows that, without more information on the D M 's belie fs (see Remark 
4.1 below), Shafer rationality is the only empirical implication of the assumption that 
the D M  has C E U  preferences with utility u. That is, the extension from belief functions 
to capacities has no empirical relevance. 
It is important to remark, though, that sharper predictions could be made if it were 
possible to observe the D M's choices on different subsets of :F. For instance, consider 
Problem 1 with E = 2, and suppose that the D M  has beliefs given by the capacity 
v( {w1}) = 3/4, v( {w2}) = 3/4. It is easy to verify that v is not supermodular, hence 
not a belief function. If faced with the restricted choice set {g, h }, the D M  will choose 
g, and if faced with {f, h}, she will choose f .  But these choices cannot be made by a 
C E U  D M  whose capacity is a belief function.6 Hence, being able to observe the D M's 
revealed preferences over multiple choice sets enables us to impose tighter constraints on 
her beliefs. 
4 Remarks 
4. 1 It follows from Theorem 2 that we obtain the same notion of rationality as long 
as we require the D M 's beliefs to belong to any class of capacities containing the set VB. 
( This will be the case, for instance, if we assume that the D M  is ambiguity averse in the 
sense of [1 5] .) 
However, this fails to be true if we consider sets of beliefs which are proper subsets 
of VB. For instance, having seen how we justify the D M 's choice of h in Problem 1, one 
could wonder whether the additional predictive power of Choquet rationality is only due 
to "completely ignorant" beliefs, like the one which is 0 everywhere but on every event 
implied by some A � n. These are belief functions which are usually called "unanimity 
games" (see App . A.2), and they entail a (constrained) "maxmin" rule : An act is not 
ruled out if it is a maxmin choice over A. The answer is no : There are problems in which 
6 To see why, recall first that if the DM's beliefs are represented by a belief function v', the core C(v') 
is non-empty and Eq. (3) applies. The choice of f over h implies that there is a probability P E C(v') 
such that P({w1}) > 2/3. The choice of g over h that there is P' E C(v') such that P'({w2}) > 2/3, or 
equivalently P'({w1}) < 1/3. But by (3) we then have 
lo f dv' :S lo f dP' < 1, 
so that f cannot be preferred over h (whose expectation is 2) . This provides the required contradiction. 
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an act is strongly dominated and Choquet rational, and it cannot be rationalized by a 
belief function with this degenerate form. 7 o 
4. 2 Problem 1 proves that Choquet dominance is strictly weaker (rules out fewer acts) 
than strong dominance. Moreover, it is strictly stronger than pure dominance . In fact, 
it follows from the monotonicity of Choquet integrals that a strategy which is purely 
dominated is Choquet dominated, while the converse is false . For example, consider the 
following decision problem: 
f 
g 
h 
8 0 
4 4 
5 1 
PROBLEM 2 
Clearly no act is purely dominated. By constructing the extended problem one can check 
that his strongly dominated by the convex combination off and g with weight 1/2, hence 
it is Choquet dominated . <> 
4. 3 A model different from C E U, which also allows ambiguity to matter in decision 
making is the "multiple priors" model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [ 1 7]. In this model 
beliefs are represented by a non-empty closed and convex set of probabilities C, and an 
act f E :F is evaluated via the functional 
min i u(f(w)) P(d!JJ). PEC n 
Schmeidler [29, Proposition] shows that the multiple prior model and CEU  are not nested, 
but they have a non-empty intersection corresponding to the case of D Ms with super­
modular beliefs. 
What is the relation between Choquet rationality and what we will call multiple 
priors rationality (see also [11])? Since belief functions are supermodular, multiple priors 
rationality is weaker than Choquet rationality . To see that it is strictly weaker, consider 
Problem 3 (which is a modification of an example of Klibanoff in [22]) . Let C be the 
7 For instance, consider the following variation on Problem 1: 
f 
g 
h 
W1 W2 
3 1.1 
0 3 
1 2 
h is Choquet rational, but it cannot be rationalized by a unanimity game (enough positive weight on w2 
is needed to make f sufficiently bad). 
8 
f 
g 
h 
1 .5 
0 
0. 7 
2 3. 5 
2.1 4 
2 3. 7 
PROBLEM 3 
closed and convex class of probabilities on D defined as the convex hull of the probabilities 
P1 = ( 0, 1, 0) and P2 = (1/2, 0, 1/2). It is straight forward to verify that C rationalizes the 
choice of h. On the other hand, Choquet dominance rules h out.8 In conclusion : C E U  
maximizing behavior makes sharper predictions than the maximization of the multiple 
priors functional . <> 
5 Choquet Rationality with Randomizations 
In this section we discuss the consequences of the assumption of Choquet rationality in 
the case in which: 1) there is an unambiguous (additive ) randomizing device that the 
D M  can use to actively randomize her choice over acts; 2) the DM employs the device, so 
that she considers �(F) to be her choice set, rather than F. This is relevant especially in 
view of the application of our results to the solution of strategic form games in Section 7. 
The presence of a randomizing device does not change the characterization of (S EU) 
rationality. In fact, if a "mixed" act (a nondegenerate probability in � ( F)) is optimal 
with respect to some additive beliefs, then every "pure" act (a degenerate probability in 
�(F)) in the support of the randomization is also optimal . Hence, the set of rational 
strategies when randomization is allowed is the set of all the randomizations over the 
rational pure acts. 9 However, it is widely believed that ambiguity averse C EU preferences 
necessarily embody preference for randomization . That is, a mixed act might be preferred 
by a C EU D M  to every pure act in its support, so that she would strictly prefer to make 
use of a randomizing device, if available. Therefore, the analysis of Choquet rationality 
might change sensibly . 
The fact that ambiguity aversion gives rise to pre ference for randomization has been 
debated in the literature on decision making. Indeed, pre ference for randomization ap­
pears in the Anscombe-Aumann framework used by Schmeidler (29], with his notion of 
8 Indeed, f, g and h are comonotonic, and the following claim is easily verified: For a comonotonic set 
of acts :F, strong dominance and Choquet dominance are equivalent. Also, notice that the example is not 
knife-edge: We could even make h strictly better for the multiple priors DM by adding an t: E (0, 0.05) 
to all its entries. 
9 The point of view that players in a game might actively randomize is increasingly criticized by game 
theorists (see, e.g., the discussion in Osborne and Rubinstein (25, pp. 37-45]) . 
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ambiguity aversion (which is equivalent to supermodularity of belie fs). However this re­
sult has some problems. First of all, recent work by Epstein [1 0] and Ghirardato and 
Marinacci [1 5] has cast some doubts on whether ambiguity aversion is indeed charac­
terized by supermodularity. More crucially, Schmeidler 's result builds on the two-stage 
structure of the Anscombe-Aumann model. That is, it is assumed that the D M  will 
evaluate act (]' E Ll ( :F) according to the functional 
1 (L (]'(!) f(w)) v(dw). O fE:F ( 6) 
Differently from the additive case, though , the order of integration matters for Choquet 
integrals. Hence ( 6) is in general not the same as the reverse functional 
L (]'(!) (1 f(w) v(dw)) . 
fE:F !1 
( 7) 
In other words, the logical order in which the state of nature and the result of the 
randomization are decided matters. Eq . ( 6) evaluates mixed acts as if the state is decided 
first, and then the randomization is performed. Eq. ( 7) does the opposite. Preference 
for randomization occurs for supermodular capacities when ( 6) is how the D M  judges 
mixed acts . It does not, so that the analysis of the previous sections is valid, if ( 7) is used 
instead: If f and f' are pure acts that are indifferent, then clearly any randomization over 
them will have the same utility . It is not obvious that ( 6) has any conceptual precedence 
over ( 7). 
An i nteresting way to avoid the arbitrariness in this choice, suggested by Eichberger 
and Kelsey [8] ( E K), is to study the existence of preference for randomization in a one­
stage approach: Build the randomizing device into the framework (by enlarging the 
state space with the outcomes of the randomization), and assume that randomizing 
device and states of nature are stochastically independent. Using a weak notion of 
(stochastic) independence, E K  show that a D M  with supermodular beliefs is indifferent 
to randornization .10 And it is possible to use a result of Ghirardato [14] to show that 
if a stronger notion of independence is used, a similar result holds for general C E U  
preferences. Thus it seems that (if independence is properly modelled) no preference for 
randomization can appear in the one-stage case. 
Setting these doubts aside, we now show the consequences of Choquet rationality if 
the D M's strategy set is Ll(:F) ,  and she evaluates mixed acts according to ( 6).11 Suppose 
10 However there is a problem with using this one-stage construction and assuming supermodularity. 
Klibanoff (23] shows that an intuitive strengthening of EK's independence condition then forces the DM's 
beliefs to be be additive. 
11 Obvious symmetry consideration suggest that it would be also appropriate to extend our analysis to 
the case in which D is infinite (also the other player can play a mixed strategy! ) . This requires extending 
the results in App. A to the infinite case. Such extension seems possible, but it goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, without changing the substance of our results. 
1 0  
that act O" E 6. (:F) is (strongly) dominated. Then there is O"* E 6. (:F) such that for every 
w EO L O"*(j) f(w) > L O"(j) f(w). 
fE:F fE:F 
For any mixed act O" E 6. (:F) , define Cf on N as follows : For every A EN , 
CJ(A) = minO"(w) - min L O"(f)  f(w). WEA WEA fE:F 
Using ( 8), it is immediate to see that in particular we have that for every A EN , 
CJ*(A) > CJ(A). 
( 8) 
( 9) 
That is , the extension of O"* (strongly) dominates the extension of O" on N. It is now simple 
to see that O"* Shafer dominates O" ,  so that O" cannot be Shafer rational. 12 A straightforward 
modification of Theorem 2 then implies that O" cannot be Choquet rational . We have 
thus proved : 
Proposition 1 Suppose that the DM1s choice set is given by 6. (:F) 1 and randomizations 
are evaluated by Eq. ( 6). Then a (mixed) act O" E 6. ( :F) is Choquet rational if and only 
if it is not (strongly) dominated. 
Thus , under the conditions of the Proposition , Choquet rationality and standard ratio­
nality coincide.13 
However , it is probably worth closing by reiterating that this is not going to be true if 
we model (the D M 's evaluation of) randomized acts according to the opposite two-stage 
structure , or a one-stage structure (under suitable independence conditions) . In that case 
the set of Choquet rational acts is the set of the randomizations over the pure Choquet 
rational acts , as described by Theorem 1 .  
6 Ordinal Rationality 
6.1 Risk and Ambiguity: Ordinal Rationality and Choquet Ra­
tionality 
As mentioned in the Introduction , Borgers [ 3] studies the case in which , though the D M 's 
ranking of the possible consequences of her decisions is known , we do not know her risk 
attitude (that is , her cardinal utility index) . He considers a S E U  D M  who has a given 
12 This follows from Eq. (13) in App. A.2: Given that (9) holds, for every probability on N, the 
expectation of the LHS is strictly greater than that of the RHS. But each probability corresponds to a 
belief function, and each such expectation is equal to the Choquet integral with respect to some belief 
function. 
13 A similar result was proved by Klibanoff (21] for the multiple priors model. 
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preference ordering over consequences, and asks which acts she might play. That is, which 
acts are best replies to some (additive ) belief, and some cardinal utility index representing 
her (given ) preferences over the possible outcomes.14 We call such acts ordinally rational. 
In this first subsection we discuss the relation between ordinal rationality and Choquet 
rationality. Precisely: Suppose that we observe a D M  facing a given decision problem 
(with cardinal payoffs given by a function u) . Will the predictions obtained by varying 
her ambiguity attitude be different from those obtained by varying her risk attitude? As 
we show by example, the answer is yes. This provides an interesting qualitative difference 
between ambiguity aversion and risk aversion. 
Given an act f E :F, we say that it is ordinally dominated if for every subset A� D, 
there is an act f A E :F \ {f} such that f A weakly dominates f on A. That is, for every 
w EA, 
f A (w) t f(w), 
with strict inequality for some w E A. Borgers shows that ordinal rationality can be 
characterized by ordinal dominance as follows: 
Proposition 2 (Borgers [3]) An act f is ordinally rational if and only if it is not 
ordinally dominated. 
For example, consider Problem 1 with E = 1 :  Act his ordinally rational, since neither f 
nor g weakly dominate h on the subset D. (This is also seen by considering the monotonic 
transformation of payoffs given by rp, where rp(3) = 3, rp(l) = 2, rp(O) = 0 .) 
To see that Choquet rationality and ordinal rationality give different predictions, 
consider first Problem 1 with E = 0. Act h is ordinally dominated (by either of the 
other acts on D, by f on {w1},  by g on {w2} ), but it is not Choquet dominated (it can be 
rationalized by the "completely ignorant" capacity which is 0 except on D). The intuition 
is the following: Even if Row 's risk attitude is not correctly reflected by the numbers 
in the game table, (if she is ambiguity neutral ) she will not choose h, since whatever 
her beliefs she will be better off by choosing either of the other acts (in this problem 
ordinal dominance does not have additional predictive power over standard dominance ). 
On the other hand, she might choose h if she is extremely ambiguity averse, thinking 
that whatever she does, the worst possible state will obtain . Then she is indifferent over 
all her acts . 
The opposite can also happen . Consider Problem 2: As explained in Remark 2, there 
h is not Choquet rational since the convex combination of f and g with weight 1/2 
dominates h in the extended problem . However, his ordinally rational, since no other 
14 As usual, we say that a function u : :F x n ----+ R represents '.'::: if for every (!, w), (!', w') E :F x n, 
f(w) '.'::: f'(w') {===} u(f(w)) = u(f, w) 2 u(f', w') = u(f'(w')). 
1 2  
act weakly dominates it on D (alternatively, transform the payoff which is now 4 to a 2, 
and check that no convex combination of f and g dominates h). The point here is that 
f ,  g and h are similar in their riskiness (they are comonotonic ), so that C E U  does not 
really buy anything more than S E U  (cf. footnote 8) : If the D M  is sufficiently confident 
that the state is w1 , she chooses f ,  and if she doesn't, she is better off by playing the safe 
option g. On the other hand, interpret the numbers in the decision table as monetary 
payoffs and assume that the D M  is very risk averse around 0, but relatively risk neutral 
between 1 and 8. Then if she assigns a probability to w1 which is large but not too large, 
she might prefer h to both the other acts. 
6.2 Ordinal Choquet Rationality 
In this subsection we extend Borgers's analysis (3) to the C E U  case. That is, we ask 
which predictions can be made if we only know the D M's ordinal ranking t of outcomes 
(!, w) E F x D, but do not know her u. The following definition adapts Borgers's 
definition to the case in which the DM is a CEU  maximizer whose beliefs are represented 
by a belief function . 
Definition 3 An act f* E F is called ordinally Shafer rational if there exists a utility 
function u representing t and a belief function v E VB such that for all f E F1 
1 u(f*(w)) v(c!JJJ) 21 u(f(w)) v(dw). 
Extend t to a complete preorder >,::= on F x N as follows: For any A, A' E N and 
f ,  f' E :F let (!,A) >,::= (!',A') if 
min (!, w) t min (!', w'), 
wEA w'EA' 
where min wEA (f , w) is at-minimal element of {f} x A. As usual, we denote by>- the 
asymmetric component of >,::=. 
Theorem 3 Act f* E F is ordinally Shafer rational if and only if for every non-empty 
subset A � N there is no f E F such that for all A E A1 
(!,A)>,::= (!*,A), (10) 
with >- holding for at least one A E A. 
As we did previously, we will call ordinally Shafer dominated an act f* such that for every 
A� N there is f E F for which (10) holds. The proof of the result is a simple adaptation 
of the proof of Theorem 1, and it is given in Appendix D. The next step (omitted for 
brevity ) is to observe that a result like Theorem 2 holds also in this case, showing that we 
add no generality by defining ordinal Choquet rationality. In other words, ordinal Shafer 
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f 
g 
h 
a 
b 
b 
c c 
b b 
c c 
Table 2: The extension of Problem 4 
dominance completely characterizes the behavior of a CEU  maximizer whose preference 
ranking is given by t. Hence we can equivalently talk about ordinal Choquet dominance 
(pace Shafer). 
As we had above ,  it is immediate to notice that if an act is purely dominated , then it 
is ordinally Choquet dominated. To see that the converse is not true , consider Problem 
4. Assume that the D M  ranks the "physical" outcomes as follows: a >- b >- c. Clearly 
f 
g 
h 
a c 
b b 
b c 
PROBLEM 4 
h is not strictly dominated by f or g. The extended decision problem is depicted in 
Table 2. With a little work one can then use the table to check that h is ordinally 
Choquet dominated . 
Finally , Problem 1 with E = 0 shows that ordinal rationality is more selective than or ­
dinal Choquet rationality: As pointed out before , ordinal rationality rules out h, but ( un­
surprisingly) ordinal Choquet rationality does not (consider the family A =  {{wi, w2}}). 
However , the considerations made above to show that Choquet rationality is almost more 
restrictive than ordinal rationality can be repeated here , to show that ordinal Choquet 
dominance does not buy much more than ordinal rationality . Indeed , h will never be a 
strict best reply to a capacity v. That is , for any utility function u representing t and 
any capacity v, both f or g will always be at least as good as h. This is true in general , as 
it is an immediate consequence of the monotonicity of Choquet integrals that: If Borgers 
dominance results in a smaller set than ordinal Choquet dominance , for every ordinally 
Choquet undominated act there is some Borgers undominated act indifferent to it (with 
respect to the rationalizing u and v) . But this is no surprise , since we have seen in the 
previous subsection that Choquet rationality allows predictions which are ruled out by 
ordinal rationality only under these circumstances. 
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7 An Application: Choquet Rationalizatibility 
A natural application of our characterization result is to the definition of a solution 
concept for strategic-form n-person games, that we call ( "correlated" ) Choquet ratio­
nalizability. In the same spirit as Bernheim [1] and Pearce [26] 's solution concept, one 
can ask which subset of strategy n-tuples is the largest Cartesian set with the following 
property: Every strategy for player i included in the set is a best reply to a capacity 
which reflects player i's belief that the other players will also play a strategy in the set. 
For a strong notion of "belief" , the exercise is straightforward, since we can make use of 
a general characterization result of Epstein [11]. We thus content ourselves with giving 
the necessary definitions and stating the results. Given a DM with beliefs v E V on the 
state space 0,  we say that the DM believes an event Es;:;; 0 if v(EcuF) = v(F) for e very 
F s;:;; 0.15 Notice that when v is not additive this is stronger than requiring v(Ec) = 0. 
Consider now the decision problem faced by each player i E I in the strategic form 
game r = (I, (Si)iEJ, (ui)iEJ),16 where n = s_i - x#i sj. We say that a set R = 
R1 x ... x R1 of strategy profiles is the Choquet rationalizable set if it is the largest 
Cartesian subset of S = x iEI Si with the property: For every i E I and every si E Ri, si 
is a best reply to some capacity vi on S_i which believes R_i - x#i Rj· In other words, 
every strategy si E Ri is Choquet rational for the state space R-i· It follows from [11, 
Theorem 3.2] that the Choquet rationalizable set is nonempty and it coincides with the 
unique result of the procedure of iterated deletion of Choquet dominated strategies.17 
For instance, applying this result to the following game (which is based on Problem 3) 
we find that the Choquet rationalizable set is {M} x {R}. Clearly, if the conditions of 
T 
M 
B 
L c 
1.5 ' -1 2 ' 1 
0 ' -1 2.1 ' 0  
0.7' 2 2 ,0 
A GAME 
R 
3.5 ' 0 
4 ' 1 
3.7' -1 
Proposition 1 hold instead, Choquet rationalizability and rationalizability coincide. 
F inally we have the epistemic characterization of Choquet rationalizability. We can 
use the type space discussed in [11] to define the event that each player i EI is Choquet 
rational (i.e., plays a Choquet rational strategy ), and that this is common belief among 
15 In decision theoretic jargon: the DM believes E if Ee is Savage-null (see [11); for a proof of the 
equivalence see Schmeidler [29, Remark 4.3)) . This notion of belief is quite strong. For instance, a 
popular notion of equilibrium for games with CEU players (Dow and Werlang's [7) Nash equilibrium 
with Knightian uncertainty) predicts outcomes which are ruled out by Choquet rationalizability. 
16 As usual, each strategy set is finite, I is finite, and Ui : S --t R 
17 As in Epstein's more general case, the order of deletion of Choquet dominated strategies does not 
matter. 
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all players . The desired result then follows from [11, Theorem 6.3]: A strategy profile s is 
Choquet rationalizable if and only if all players are Choquet rational and this is common 
belief. 
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Appendix A Additive Representations of Choquet 
Integrals 
Here we discuss how to represent Choquet integrals as standard integrals on a state space 
which is strictly larger than n. There is already a widely known result of this form that 
represents (for a finite S1) a Choquet integral with respect to a capacity v as an integral 
with respect to a signed measure on the space 2° (see Corollary 1 below). We provide 
here a different decomposition which , even though it uses an even larger state space 
and is not unique , has the great advantage from our perspective of always expressing a 
Choquet integral as an integral with respect to a probability measure. 
To avoid technical difficulties that would bring us beyond the scope of this paper , we 
henceforth restrict our attention to the case in which S1 is finite. We believe ,  however , 
that a similar decomposition can be obtained also for infinite state spaces. 
A.1 Capacities 
Let V be the set of all the normalized capacities on n. Assuming that #Sl = L we have 
that V � R!, where K = 2L. As V is obviously convex , closed and bounded , it is the 
convex hull of its extreme points (for a proof see , e.g. , Rockafellar [27, Corollary 18.5.1] ). 
The latter are all the capacities v such that v(A) = 0 or v(A) = 1 for all A � n, the {O, 1 }­
valued capacities (for a proof see Choquet [5, Theorem 40.1]). We let £ - { e1, . . .  , eN} 
be the collection of all such {O, 1 }-valued capacities (clearly 2K-2 2 N 2 K - 1). Given 
e E £ consider the family Ae of subsets which are assigned weight 1 by e. Let Be be the 
set of all the elements of Ae which are minimal with respect to set inclusion. That is , 
Be - {A� S1:  e(A) = 1, VB c A, e(B) = O}. 
Clearly the mapping e t------7 Be gives a bijection between the set £ and the set B of all the 
classes B of subsets of S1 satisfying the property that if A, B E B ,  then both A\ B -::/= 0 
and B \A-::/= 0. We then have an interesting representation of Choquet integrals: 
Proposition 3 For every capacity v on (Sl , 2°) there is a probability measure a(v) on 
(£, 2£) such that for every f : S1 -t R1 the Choquet integral of f w. r . t. v admits the 
following additive decomposition: 
N 
r f(w) v(c!MJ) = I: an(v) max [min f(w)], � AEBn wEA n=l (11) 
where we let Bn = B en and O:n = a(v)(en) · 
Proof: Let f : S1 -t R. We first show that the Choquet integral of f w.r.t. a capacity 
e E £ can be written as follows 
r f(w) e(c!MJ) = max [min f(w)], Jo AEBe WEA 
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(12) 
To see why this is true , start by relabelling the elements of n so that f(w1) 2 ... 2 f(wL)· 
Using the definition of the Choquet integral in (2) we have that 
1 f(w) e(dw) = f(wc), 
where JJ, is the smallest integer such that e( {wi, ... , we})= 1. Since f(wc) = mini<i<£ f(wi), 
we only need to show that min1�i::::C f ( wi) = maxAEBJminwEA f ( w)). If that were not the 
case then there would be an A E Be such that A � { w1, . . .  , Wg_1}, which is impossible 
by the definition of the index JJ,. This concludes the proof of (12). 
Using (12), it is immediate to obtain the additive decomposition in (11). Since Vis the 
convex hull of£ , for any v EV there is (at least one ) vector a(v) = [a1(v), . .. , aN(v)], 
satisfying an(v) 2 0 for every n and Ln an(v) = 1 ,  such that we can write v = 
Ln an(v) en- Clearly the vector a(v) can be extended to a probability on 2c:, which 
we will denote identically . 
We now recall the simple fact that the Choquet integral is linear in the integrating 
capacity to obtain 
1 f(w) v(dw) 
which is what we wanted to show . 
N 
1 f(w) [L an(v)en](dw) 
n n=l 
N 
L an(v) 1 f(w) en(dw), 
n=l n 
N 
� an(v) max [min f(w)], L...J AEBn wEA n=l 
I 
Notice that the additive decomposition is not in general unique . That is , there can 
be multiple measures a(v) for which (11) holds for every f. This is immediate from the 
proof of Proposition 3: Each a(v) corresponds to one of the (in general multiple ) ways 
to express v as a convex combination of the extreme points e E £ .  
A.2 Belief Functions 
Let VB be the subset of V containing all the belief functions . Clearly every v E VB is 
a convex combination of points of £ ,  as described above . We will now show that every 
such v can be expressed as a unique convex combination of extreme points belonging 
to a subset £ B � £ ,  the set of all the unanimity games. A capacity e is a unanimity 
game if there is A � D such that e(B) = 1 if A � B and e(B) = 0 otherwise . We use 
the notation eA for the unanimity game on set A� D. Clearly every unanimity game is 
{O, 1 }-valued , hence an element of£ , and it is easy to check that it is a belief function . 
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Let N = 2° \ 0 and £B _ { eA : A E N}. Indeed , one can show that the set £B can 
be used to generate by linear combination any v E V, and by convex combination any 
v E VB. This is the point of the following result due to Shapley [32) . 
Proposition 4 The family £B forms a linear basis for V. That is1 for any v E V there 
is a vector <p(v) E R(K-l) such that 
v = L <p(v)(A) eA. 
AEN 
In particular <p(v) is non-negative if and only if v E VB. 
The last statement implies our claim that the set VB is equal to the convex hull £ B .  In 
terms of the previous subsection , we have that a decomposition of v E VB over V is the 
one with weights given by a(v), where a(v)(e) = <p(v)(A) for every e = eA, A EN, and 
a(v)(e) = 0 for e E £ \ £B. The function <p(v) is called the Mobius transform of v. We 
thus immediately have the following: 
Corollary 1 Given v E VB1 there is a unique probability measure <p(v) on (EB , 2&B) 
such that for every f : 0 ----+ R1 the Choquet integral of f w. r. t. v admits the following 
additive decomposition: 
r f(w) v(dw) = L <p(v)(A) [min f(w)] . lo WEA AEN 
(13) 
Proof: Once again , start by observing that the Choquet integral of a function f : 0 ----+ R 
with respect to a unanimity game eA, A � 0, is 
r f(w) eA(dw) = min f(w). lo WEA (14) 
This follows immediately from (12) and the observation that the class BeA contains only 
the set A. Now , given any v E VB, the observation following Proposition 4 proves that 
we can rewrite (11) as follows: 
1 f(w) v(dw) 
which is what we had to prove . 
N 
1 f (w) [L an(v)en](dw) 
0 n=l 
L <p(v)(A) 1 f(w) eA(dw), 
AEN O 
L <p(v)(A) [min f (w)] , 
N wEA AE 
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As we observed at the beginning of this appendix , the decomposition in (13) is widely 
known . It follows immediately from Proposition 4 that it can be extended to any capacity 
v, with the important caveat that then ({J(v) is a probability if and only if v is a belief 
function (in general ({J( v) can take negative values ) . 18 We chose to state and prove the 
Corollary in this way to show the connection between the usual decomposition result and 
that contained in Proposition 3. We also remark that in this case uniqueness of ({J(v) 
obtains because the "extended state space" N has the same cardinality as the set over 
which v can take positive values (which is N itself ) . 
Appendix B Sarne Domination Results 
Let S and T be finite sets with #S = Jiil and #T = N. Let U : S x T _____, R. The 
following well -known result is due to Van Damme [33] and Pearce [26]. It can easily be 
proved using a result on linear inequalities (see , e.g . ,  Gale [13, Theorem 2.10]) . 
Proposition 5 Let s* E S and S '  = S \ { s*}. Exactly one of the following alternatives 
holds: 
1. Either there does exist an a E Li(T) such that for all s E SJ 
L a(t) U(s*, t) ;::: L a(t) U(s, t), (15) 
tET tET 
where a(t) is the probability that a assigns to t ET; 
2. or there is a O" E Li(S') such that for all t E T 
L O"(s) U(s, t) > U(s*, t). (16) 
sES1 
Using the decision-theoretic terminology: An act is a best reply to some (additive ) belief 
iff it is not strongly dominated . 
It is immediate to use the additive decomposition results in the previous appendix to 
obtain as corollaries of Proposition 5 domination results for the case in which the players 
are C E U  maximizers . For instance , we have the following characterization of best replies 
to belief functions: 
Corollary 2 Let :F and n be finite} and u : n _____, R. Let J* E :F and :F' = :F \ {J*}. 
Exactly one of the following alternatives holds: 
18 For finite state space, the result was first proved for belief functions by Shafer (31], and extended to 
supermodular capacities by Chateauneuf and Jaffray (4). Gilboa and Schmeidler observed in (18] that 
the result is true for any capacity and extended it to infinite D. 
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1. Either there does exist a v  E VB such that for all f E F1 
1 u(f*(w)) v(dw) 2: 1 u(f(w)) v(dw); 
2. or there is a <J E �(F') such that for all A EN 
L <Y(j) [min u(J(w))] > [min u(f*(w))]. WEA WEA fE:F' 
( 17) 
( 18) 
Proof: To apply the result of Proposition 5 ,  let T = N ,  S = F and define U : S x T -----+ R 
by 
U(s, t) = minu(s(w)) . wEt 
In fact notice that by Eq . ( 13) and the definition of U, if there is a E �(T) satisfying 
( 15) the n the belief function v E VB, defined as l:t a(t) et , is such that the inequalities 
( 17) are satisfied . I 
A similar result could be proved for general capacities , but , as we show in Theorem 2 ,  
it would really yield a characterization equivalent to the one seen in Corollary 2. 
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 2 
We only need to prove that if J* is Choquet rational , then it is Shafer rational . That is , 
we show that given a capacity v which rationalizes J*, i .e . ,  is such that for all f E :F, 
1 f*(w) v(dw) 2: 1 f(w) v(dw), ( 19) 
there is a belief functionµ =µ(!*) for which ( 19) holds mutatis mutandis. This is done 
by first constructing the belief function µ as follows: Pick one additive representation 
a(v) of v, as obtained in Proposition 3 .  Consider the following correspondence from E 
into N: 
A(e) ={A E Be : f*(A) 2: f*(B) , VB E Be }, 
where the extension of every act in F to N is defined in Eq. ( 4), and let .A : E -----+ N be 
a selection from A (i .e . ,  .A(e) E A(e) for all e EE) . For every A EN , let E(A) be defined 
as follows: 
E(A) - {e EE: A =  .A(e)}. 
(The identity of J* is relevant for that of E(A). For this reason , the µ we construct 
depends on J*.) Consider now the number 
<p(A) = L a(v)(e). 
eEE(A) 
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It is immediate to see that cp is a function cp : N-------+ [O, 1), and that l.:::AEN cp(A) = 1 .  Let 
µ be the belief function which has cp as Mobius transform, that is, 
µ(A) = L cp(B). 
B�A 
We now proceed to show that µ rationalizes the choice of f*. Notice that from 
Eqs . (4), (19), and (1 1) we have that for every f E F, 
L a(v)(e) max [f*(A)] 2: L a(v)(e) max [f(A)). AEBe AEBe eEe eEe 
The left-hand side is rewritten as follows: 
L cp(A) f*(A) = L a(v)(e) max [f*(A)). AEBe AEN eEt: 
As for the right-hand side, we have that 
L a(v)(e) max [f(A)) > L a(v)(e) [f(,\(e))] AEBe eEt: eEt: 
L cp(A) f (A), 
AEN 
where the first inequality follows from the immediate observation that for every f E F 
and e E £, maxAEBJf(A)] 2: f(,\(e)). We thus conclude that for every f E F, 
L cp(A) f*(A) 2: L cp(A) f (A), 
AEN AEN 
which, when written as a Choquet integral, gives 
1 f*(w) µ(dw) 2: 1 f(w) µ(dw). 
Appendix D Proof of Theorem 3 
We start by proving that if an act f is ordinally Shafer dominated, then it cannot 
be ordinally Shafer rational . For any belief function v E VB, let cp(v) be its Mo bi us 
transform, and let u be a utility function representing� .  Let A_ {A EN: cp(v)(A) > 
O }. Since f is ordinally Shafer dominated, there exists f* E F such that (!*,A) >;:::= (!,A) 
for all A E A, with a strict inequality for at least one A E A. We deduce that 
1 u(f*(w)) v(dw) > 1 u(f(w)) v(dw). 
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For the other direction, assume that f* E :F is not ordinally Shafer dominated . Take any 
A � N. Then by Borgers [ 3, Lemma ), there exists a utility function u representing >;:: 
and a probability r.p on A such that for all f E F, 
L r.p(A) u(f*, A) 2 L r.p(A) u(f, A). 
AEA AEA 
Finally let z; be the belief function induced by the vector of weights r.p (see Proposition 4), 
so that eq . (13) gives the result . 
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